India’s nuclear tests under Operation Shakti (Pokhran-II), conducted between 11 and 13 May 1998, formally established the country as a nuclear-weapons state. This step built upon the earlier peaceful nuclear explosion known as Smiling Buddha (Pokhran-I) of 18 May 1974 and reflected a calculated strategic choice driven largely by security concerns involving China and Pakistan. India achieved this capability without acceding to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The tests paved the way for the official articulation of India’s No First Use (NFU) doctrine on 4 January 2003 (Ministry of External Affairs, 2003). In the wake of the Indian Defence Minister’s some remarks on indicating that a review of the NFU doctrine could be considered, this article examines whether such a reassessment is necessary. It analyses the original rationale for NFU, the credibility of the commitments it entails, the implications of counterforce strategies, the complications introduced by tactical nuclear weapons (especially in the Pakistan context), and the broader problems associated with both first-use and no-first-use postures in India’s two-front nuclear environment involving China and Pakistan.